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Abstract
This paper presents a model of conflict that combines popular sup-
port and asymmetric fighting technologies in a civil war setting. Start-
ing with different endowments, two parties must decide on the amount
of resources to divert from production to fighting. The conditions for
conflict to arise are derived and civil war is shown to be subject to effi-
ciency and distributive costs. Two other equilibria can occur, the first
involving only one side choosing to arm, and the other a peace equi-
librium where both groups choose zero fighting effort. The model is
consistent with various historical accounts of the different roads to war
and with recent empirical evidence on the determinants of conflict.
Although the model focuses on civil wars, it can easily be extended
to other situations that involve conflict such as rent seeking, political
campaigning or litigation.
I. Introduction
Production and predation are different means by which individuals seek
to obtain resources. Appropriation, be it in the form of crime, litigation,
lobbying, strikes or any rent-seeking activity, dominates many aspects of
economic life.
In fact, whether individual or collective, almost any decision that involves
the allocation of resources is made against the backdrop of this consideration.
Failure to anticipate predation from an opponent can be disastrous in terms
of lost income, but so can be the failure to realize that appropriation can be
as rewarding as production.
∗JEL Classification Numbers: D72, D74.
†I would like to thank Jack Hirshleifer, Ron Smith, Ken Hori, Paul Schwinzer and
Piergiorgio Alessandri for helpful comments.
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So the question is not whether to devote resources to appropriative ac-
tivities that could otherwise be used productively, but where to strike the
right balance. As Hirshleifer (1988, p.202) explicitly put it “the decision
variable on each side is not the discrete transition between war and peace
but the proportions in which efforts are divided between the two ways of
seeking advantage”. For a government this decision can take the form of
determining how much to spend on military and defense activities, for a po-
litical campaign establishing what fraction of its budget to use in negative
advertising, and for firms deciding how much to invest in trying to capture
rents and special rights from regulators and lawmakers.
Civil wars are specific manifestations of this problem. They typically
involve a government that must decide on the amount of resources it will
commit to protection from potential insurgents who, in turn, must decide
whether to engage in productive endeavors or predatory activities. This
line of analysis has been widely used in the literature to explain both the
occurrence and implications of wars1. By using a rational choice framework
where agents maximize expected income, these models typically show that
conflict produces Pareto-inefficient outcomes and that war can have large
distributive consequences2.
Portraying insurgents as solely motivated by income has been the preva-
lent modelling choice in economics. It may be true that rebellion is the
product of real objective grievances felt by certain groups of the population;
or it could be that grievances are not real but rather perceived to be real,
and exist only in the minds of those claiming to represent the oppressed; or
yet, it could also be that insurgents, knowing them to be false, use grievances
to hide their true intentions of economic gain. The point is that it makes no
difference: rebels can be portrayed as income maximizers because it is their
ability to finance themselves, not their motives, that allows them to survive
and fight.
This fact has lead many authors to treat them as large-scale organized
crime. Brito and Intrilligator (1992) model insurgents as providers of protec-
tion for drug-traffickers, while Grossman (1995 and 1999) treats revolutions
as a struggle between kleptocrats seeking to increase their share in income,
and Collier (2000b) presents rebellion as a distinctive form of organized
crime that predates on natural resources.
There is also empirical evidence pointing in the same direction. Collier
and Hoeﬄer (2001) analyze the occurrence of civil wars by looking at a sam-
ple of 161 countries over the period 1960–99. By using objective measures
of greed and grievance to examine the risk of conflict, they find that it is
economic opportunity, not injustice, that determines the probability of war.
1See for example Grossman (1991), Hirshleifer (1988) and Skaperdas (1992). For a
general review see Sambanis (2002).
2Hirshleifer (1995), Neary (1997) and Skaperdas (1997) are examples of models ad-
dressing this second issue.
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Does this mean that grievances play no role in civil wars? Although
the results seem to rule out an explanation based on real grievances, they
are still consistent with one based on perceived grievances. But as Collier
(2000a, p.4) summarizes, “the sense of grievance may be based upon some
objective grounds for complaint, or maybe conjured up by massaging preju-
dices. However, while this distinction is morally interesting to observers —is
the cause just?— it is of no practical importance”. This paper argues oth-
erwise. Grievances do play a role, albeit for a different reason. If the public
discourse adopted by a rebel organization convinces people of the righteous-
ness of their claims, it gives them access to resources that otherwise would
only have been accessible by force and thus increases the financial viability
of rebellion. As the Vietminh manual on guerrilla warfare aptly put it:
Without the ‘popular antennae’ we would be without informa-
tion; without the protection of the people we could neither keep
our secrets nor execute quick movement; without the people
the guerrillas could neither attack the enemy nor replenish their
forces and, in consequence, they could not accomplish their mis-
sion with ardor and speed . . .
The population helps us to fight the enemy by giving us infor-
mation suggesting ruses and plans, helping us to overcome diffi-
culties due to lack of arms, and providing us with guides. It also
supplies liaison agents, hides and protects us, assists our actions
near posts, feeds us and looks after our wounded . . . cooperating
with guerrillas, it has participated in sabotage acts, in diver-
sionary actions, in encircling the enemy, and in applying the
scorched earth policy . . . on several occasions, and in coopera-
tion with guerrillas, it has taken part in combat.3
So the critical point is not whether grievances are real or perceived,
but rather the ability of insurgents to convince people about the justness
of their claims, and to transform that acceptance into effective support.
This, in turn, has important implications for modelling because the choice
of grievances becomes endogenous: rebels will champion the causes that
allow them to extract the greatest possible support.
Besides grievances, there is another choice that affects the viability of
rebellion: fighting technology. Insurgents must decide on how to employ
their fighting forces in order to capture the largest possible amount of re-
sources. And here, like in the case of grievances, it implies choosing from
a broad range of options —most of which involve an asymmetric choice of
warfare. Smaller sides, especially when subject to large differences in size or
power, will choose markedly different fighting technologies. Generally they
3Cited in O’Neil (1990, p. 72). Originally cited by Otto Heilbrunn from Bulletine
Militaire (June–August 1955) under the tittle “Guerrilla selon l’ecole Communists.”
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rely on hit-and-run attacks aimed at eroding the will and confidence of the
opponent, and emphasize the use of speed, adaptability and surprise. As
Mao points out in his analysis of guerrilla warfare:
“Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobil-
ity and attack. It must be adjusted to enemy situation, the ter-
rain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths,
the weather, and the situation of the people.
In guerrilla warfare select the tactic of seeming to come from the
east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hol-
low; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning
decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they with-
draw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him
when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla
strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots
are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked,
dispersed, exhausted and annihilated”4.
Asymmetries in fighting technology and popular support are thus essen-
tial features of conflict; and yet they have received little attention in the
literature. This paper incorporates both in a model where government and
insurgents must decide on the optimal size of their fighting forces. They
make these decisions facing a production-predation trade-off, where divert-
ing resources from production to appropriative activities reduces the side’s
own income, but increases the amount that can be captured from the oppo-
nent.
Within this framework the required conditions for conflict to emerge
and the resulting equilibrium structure are analyzed. Consistent with the
literature, conflict is shown to produce an inefficient outcome. In contrast,
however, the model shows that distributive consequences of conflict depend
only on both parties’ choice of fighting technology and that their effects are
not restricted to differences between-groups.
The next section introduces the model and the main results, and section 3
characterizes equilibria and presents some comparative statics. Conclusions
are given in the final section, together with a summary of the main results.
II. The Model
Civil war can be seen as the result of the strategic interaction between the
government and rebels seeking to capture and redistribute income. The road
to war can be described as follows. Initially there is a country inhabited only
by peasants whose effort is entirely dedicated to production. Among them,
4Mao Tse-tung (1962, p. 47).
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there are two individuals —the leaders— who are willing to organize an
armed group to capture income if the appropriate conditions arise. The two
groups will try to control the largest possible amount of output by combining
a specific fighting technology and a political discourse aimed at obtaining
popular support.
Given their choices, both groups must simultaneously decide on the op-
timal sizes of fighting forces. If both choose to have an armed force, conflict
may arise and the economy fall into civil war. Two other equilibria are
possible, one involving only one side choosing to arm, and the other an
equilibrium where both groups choose zero fighting effort.
Note that model thus focuses on the acquisition of fighting effort and not
in the war phase, so costs represent the loss of resources due to mobilization
and not the destruction of war. Note also that throughout the paper income
will be considered a proxy for political power, implying that the group that
is able to capture the largest amount of output will become the government
and the other the rebels.
The building blocks of the game are production and combat technologies.
The first specifies the way output —the game’s prize— is generated and the
second the way it is captured. We start with production.
Production
The game takes place in an economy with a population of size n composed
of government’s army soldiers g, peasants e and rebels r. Initially everyone
is a peasant.
Production takes the form y = a e where a is a productivity parameter
representing technology and e is the number of peasants (each providing one
unit of effort of the same quality). Peasants’ effort increases production at
a constant rate.
In order to capture the trade-off between production and predation, we
can use the fact that e = n− r − g in order to write production as
y(r, g) = a(n − r − g). (1)
Represented like this, production is negatively affected by recruitment as
every new combatant reduces aggregate output by the same constant amount
of a units. The maximum level of production is reached when r = g = 0
since e = n. Three things are implied by this production technology. First,
r+g < n in order to ensure there is a prize to fight for (i.e. y > 0); second, the
negative effects of recruitment are symmetric ( ∂y
∂r
= ∂y
∂g
= −a); and third,
larger a’s represent wealthier economies where peasants are more productive
and, thus, larger prizes are available for capture (i.e. a higher value for any
fraction of captured y).
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In this context aggregate costs of conflict can be measured in terms of
forgone production (i.e. y(0, 0) − y(r, g)). However, even if r = 0, costs can
be positive if g > 0; that is, when the threat of conflict forces the government
to arm itself in order to deter rebels. Finally note that (1) is not subject to
production complementarities in the sense that peasants have no influence
in other peasants’ productivity.
Fighting
Rebels combine the use of political resources and violence in their struggle
against the government. Given their importance in the model, we will dis-
cuss both in some detail. In the case of political resources, it means selecting
a public discourse that specifies (i) the grievances they wish to correct and
(ii) the goals they seek to accomplish. O’Neil’s (1990) analysis suggests
insurgents’ grievances come from three main sources.
The first is the political community or State. When insurgents reject the
idea of being part of the political community of their countries, they usually
adopt the secessionist goal of withdrawing from it in order to form a new
independent one. Such is the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTA) in Sri Lanka or the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain.
The political system, which represents the general rules, values and mech-
anisms for making and executing binding decisions, is a second source. There
are many types of political systems a society can adopt, including pluralistic,
totalitarian, autocratic, oligarchical, etc. When insurgents choose to rebel
against it, they generally adopt egalitarian goals of distributive justice (e.g.
Shining Path in Peru); pluralist goals of individual freedom and liberty (e.g.
the National Resistance Movement in Uganda); or traditionalist goals based
on ancestral ties and religion (e.g. Hizballah in Lebanon).
Even if they decide to agree with the political system and community,
insurgents may choose the authorities or the policies they pursue. In the
first case they target individuals by accusing them of corruption, oppression
or incompetence, as in the coups of 1963 in South Vietnam that overthrew
Ngo Dinh Diem, or the attempt that failed to overthrow Hugo Cha´vez in
Venezuela in 2002. In the second case they adopt goals that are either re-
formist, like the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the nationalization of
energy policy in Colombia; or preservationist, like the Ulster Defence Asso-
ciation’s (UDA) opposition to Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement.
How effective a particular discourse is in gaining popular support de-
pends on various factors. The economic and social structure can help insur-
gents gather support if in a society divided by issues like ethnicity, religion or
economic wellbeing, one group enjoys a disproportionate amount of power.
The opposite can also happen if the government undermines support for
worse-off minorities by reviving group rivalries, or if rebels recruit from dif-
ferent groups and those rivalries undermine their internal organization. But
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even if they recruit from a single group, specific group attitudes towards dis-
cipline and authority can constrain the organizational requirements of the
insurgent movement.
Political factors play a similar role. Attitudes towards issues like trust,
participation or the use of force will determine to a large extent whether
people want to get involved with the insurgents. For example, the lack of
understanding of the political process, or a belief that it is impossible to
alter it, can lead to a low desire to participate that hinders support for the
rebels. On the other hand, absence of channels to participate in the face
of a genuine desire to do so can provide a fertile ground for recruitment
and support. So even in the presence of real grievances, the backing of the
population will be conditioned by the interplay of the political system and
political culture.
The above discussion can be generalized by specifying the set of all pos-
sible political discourses X = {x1, . . . , xm}. From this set rebels will chose
x∗r such that:
Λr(x
∗
r) ≥ Λr(xi) ∀xi ∈ X,
where Λr : X → R+ maps political discourses to popular support. Given
the nature of popular support we don’t specify its functional form, but we
assume that X and Λr(·) are observed by both players. Note that popular
support is therefore determinate in the sense that rebels can choose any
xi but cannot endogenously alter its effectiveness. So as long as there is
perfect information, insurgents will choose the discourse that leverages the
greatest possible support. We also assume x∗r does not say anything about
the truthfulness of insurgents’ claims: motivation is unobservable and thus
has no effect on people’s willingness to support a specific discourse.
The second decision rebels make is how to use their combatants. Fight-
ing technologies can be broadly grouped in three categories. The first is
terrorism, which essentially involves the use of small units to target non-
combatants. Although its main purpose is to weaken the government by
instilling fear and causing demoralization and disagreement, it can also have
other objectives like “extracting particular concessions (e.g. payment of ran-
som or the release of prisoners), gaining publicity, demoralizing the popu-
lation through the creation of widespread disorder, provoking repression by
the government, enforcing obedience and cooperation from those inside and
outside the movement, fulfilling the need to avenge losses inflicted upon the
movement, and enhancing the political stature of specific factions within an
insurgent movement.”5
Guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare are the other two. The for-
mer targets government’s armed forces by relying on larger units that engage
5O’Neil, p. 25.
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in low-intensity confrontation, puts a premium on flexibility and speed, and
depends to a large extent on concealment in the general population; the
latter involves large-scale operations where insurgent units confront govern-
ment forces directly, and usually uses conventional means of combat.
The effectiveness of a fighting technology is largely driven by the physical
environment. Topography can be to the rebels’ advantage if harsh terrain
hampers the advance of government forces, or if it provides remote and
inaccessible places to hide the bases required for recovery and organizing
operations (e.g. Afghanistan’s mountains and caves); but it can also be to
their disadvantage if large open spaces predominate, where surveillance and
control are easier (e.g. Western Sahara’s desert). Size and proximity also
play a role since larger areas can be harder to isolate and control, while small
distances between insurgent operation areas facilitate logistics, coordination
and control.
Infrastructure has similar characteristics, in the sense that it can be
advantageous to any of the sides. Poor communication systems and bad
roads, rail networks or river and sea transportation systems favor insurgents
by holding back government forces; while the opposite compensates the gov-
ernment’s strategic need to have static units in specific areas and gives it
the necessary mobility to confront hit-and-run attacks.
Finally there is an issue that affects both combat effectiveness and pop-
ular support: leadership. On the one hand, leaders can directly attract
support and keep combatants motivated if they are charismatic and persua-
sive (e.g. Fidel Castro in Cuba or Jonas Savimbi in Angola), or if they are
skilled in selecting a political discourse (e.g. marxism and liberation theology
in Latin America). On the other, leaders are responsible for organizational
issues that determine political and military success (e.g. communications,
training, transportation, financing, etc.) and for maintaining unity, which
is essential to focus efforts, prevent internal disagreements and enhance co-
ordination and morale.
As in the case of political resources, we can formalize these ideas by
defining the set of available fighting technologies H = {h1, . . . , hk}, where
hi is a specific combination of weapons, targets and tactics. Rebels will
choose the fighting technology h∗r such that:
Φr(h
∗
r) ≥ Φr(hi) ∀hi ∈H,
where Φr : H→ R+ maps specific fighting technologies to combat effective-
ness (i.e. the amount of resources that can be captured by force). As in the
case of discourses, we do not specify its functional form and assume that
Φr(·) and H are observed by both parties. Therefore fighting technology is
also determinate as perfectly informed rebels will choose the most effective
technology available, but are unable to alter its effectiveness endogenously.
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So far we have focused on the rebels, but government proceeds in a
similar way. Its leader will choose the political discourse x∗g such that
Λg(x
∗
g) ≥ Λg(xi) for all xi ∈ X, and the fighting technology h∗g ∈ H that
maximizes Φg(hi). Note that the functions mapping political discourses to
popular support and fighting technologies to combat effectiveness are differ-
ent for both groups, reflecting differences in the intrinsic characteristics of
their leaders.
In this setting, conflict technology should possess two characteristics.
First, the outcome has to depend on the relative strengths of the combat-
ants’ political and armed fighting technologies. Little popular support or
an ineffective fighting technology does not necessarily imply a bad outcome
if the opponent also has weak technologies. Second, it has to be consistent
with war initiation. When r = 0 rebels must be able to capture a positive
fraction of income in order to get the necessary funds to recruit combatants.
If we let γ = Λ(x∗g) and ρ = Λ(x
∗
r), and normalize the effectiveness of
fighting technology, a modified version of the ratio-form CSF that satisfies
the two requirements is:
pr(r, g) =
ρ+ r
(ρ+ r) + (γ + φ g)
and pg(g, r) =
γ + φ g
(ρ+ r) + (γ + φ g)
,
(2)
where pr and pg are the fractions of income captured by rebels and gov-
ernment, g and r are the sizes of their fighting forces, and φ =
Φ(h∗g)
Φ(h∗r)
the
relative fighting effectiveness. Writing them like this implies income can be
captured either by political means (the fractions ρ/(·) and
γ/(·)) or by force
(the fractions r/(·) and
g/(·))
6.
Income shares given by (2) are increasing in the combatant’s own effort
and decreasing in the opponent’s, account for all available output (pr = 1−
pg), and depend only on the efforts of the players participating in conflict
7.
They are also twice continuously differentiable and subject to decreasing
returns in own effort, a fact that reflects the inability of an extra soldier to
make a difference in a large army.
Under these circumstances a party that does not fight will still capture
a positive fraction of income, but no fraction of income is guaranteed to any
party, even if it has a very large fighting force. So in a situation of total
peace the distribution of income is given by pr =
ρ
ρ+γ and pg = 1− pr.
6To avoid confusion, conflict technology denotes the combination of politics and
weapons used to capture output as specified in (2), while fighting technology refers to
a particular hi.
7In general this CSF has all the properties of contest success functions given in Skaper-
das (1996).
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Rebels’ Behaviour
The rebels face the problem of maximizing their expected income yr(r, g),
which is constrained by the production-predation restriction and by conflict
technology. Since combat effectiveness and popular support are assumed to
be common knowledge, their problem becomes:
max
r
yr(r, g) =
a(n − r − g)(ρ + r)
(ρ+ r) + (γ + φ g)
,
which can be given the standard interpretation of maximizing the capture
of produced output. The first order condition for the problem is:
∂yr
∂r
=
−a (r2 + (g − n)(γ + g φ) + (2r + ρ)(γ + ρ+ g φ))
(r + γ + ρ+ g φ)2
= 0.
Given that a, ρ, γ and φ must be positive8, g and r must be nonnegative
and n > r + g, we can solve for r to obtain the rebels’ income-maximizing
force for every size of the government’s army:
Fr(g) =
√
(n+ γ + ρ+ g(φ − 1))(γ + g φ)− (γ + ρ+ g φ). (3)
A closer look at (3) reveals the underlying mechanism behind the rebels’
optimal response. The first order condition can be written as ∂y
∂r
pr(r, g) +
∂pr
∂r
y(r, g) = 0, where the first term represents the reduction in output
from having one less peasant (marginal cost), and the second the additional
income an extra combatant can capture (marginal benefit). Marginal cost
(MC) is always negative and decreasing because every new recruit reduces
output and raises pr at a decreasing rate, making the fraction of rebels’
income lost to new recruits (−a pr) a decreasing function of r.
On the other hand, marginal benefit (MB) is always positive and de-
creasing because each new recruit increases pr, and in doing so raises the
amount of income rebels can capture by yg
1
ρ+r+γ+φ g . It is also subject to
decreasing returns both because of the decreasing returns to capture and
because larger forces imply smaller output.
What is the optimal response to an increase in the government’s forces?
The answer can be seen in figure 19. Initially, when the government’s army
is g0, the optimal rebel size is given by r0, where MC = MB. An increase
in the government’s force to g1 will lower output and pr for any level of r,
causing a fall in the amount of income every individual combatant is able to
8Moreover, φ ≥ 1 as will be shown in section III.
9Note that the MC curve is plotted in absolute value and hence represents the magni-
tude and not the sign of lost output.
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capture (shifting MB to the left), and a fall in the amount by which each
new recruit reduces yr (shifting MC down). If only the change in capture
is allowed to take place, the optimal response will be to increase marginal
benefit by lowering r to r′ (capture effect). But when the the reduction in
output is also considered, the optimal response is to increase armed size to
r1 (harm effect).
r0r1r′
y
r
MB(g0)MB(g1)
MC(g0)
MC(g1)
Figure 1: Rebels’ optimal response to increases in g
The final outcome will depend on which of the two effects dominates. If
the capture effect dominates (as in the figure: |r′−r0| > |r1−r′|), the optimal
response is to reduce the rebel force. But if the harm effect dominates, the
optimal response is to increase r. Which of the two prevails will depend on
the size of the government’s army: for small values of g the harm effect is
likely to dominate because of the large returns to capture of a small army;
for a large g the opposite is likely to be true with the capture effect being
stronger. This nonlinearity is what lies behind the slope of Fr(g) in figure
2.
Government’s Behaviour
The government also maximizes its expected income yg(g, r). It faces the
same constraints as the rebels in production and fighting, and it too observes
popular support and combat effectiveness. Hence its problem is given by:
max
g
yg(g, r) =
a(n− r − g)(γ + φ g)
(ρ+ r) + (γ + φ g)
,
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which yields the first order condition:
∂yg
∂g
=
a
(
φ(n − r)(r + ρ)− 2gφ(r + γ + ρ+ gφ2 )− γ(r + γ + ρ)
)
(r + γ + ρ+ φ g)2
= 0.
Again, given that a, ρ, γ and φ must be positive, g and r must be
nonnegative and n > r + g, we can obtain:
Fg(r) =
√
(r + ρ)(r + γ + ρ+ (n− r)φ)− (r + γ + ρ)
φ
, (4)
where Fg(r) is the government’s army that maximizes income for every size
of the rebel force. A closer look at (4) shows that when taking recruitment
decisions the government must also strike a balance between the cost of lost
output and the benefit of additional income. In fact, given the similarity
of the cases, an analysis in terms of MC and MB can also be made of the
government’s optimal response to increases in r.
Equilibrium
The outcome of this game can be represented in a triangle with sides of size
n for the government’s and rebels’ fighting forces (figure 2). Since (3) and
(4) are the combatants’ best responses to the other combatant’s actions, the
Nash equilibrium is given by g∗ and r∗, the values of g and r that make
Fr(g) = Fg(r). After some simplification solutions in R
2+ can be shown to
be:
r∗ =
γ + nφ− ρ(2√φ+ φ)
2(
√
φ+ φ)
; (5)
g∗ =
(n+ ρ)φ− γ(1 + 2√φ)
2φ(1 +
√
φ)
. (6)
Note that since the game space is an isosceles right triangle, the vertical
(or horizontal) distance of any point to the hypotenuse will be equal to
n − r − g, the number of peasants. This means that any two points lying
on a line parallel to the hypotenuse will imply the same level of production,
whilst a point in a line closer to the origin implies a higher level of output.
In other words, there are an infinite number of isoproduct lines with the
hypotenuse being y = 0 and the origin ymax = y(0, 0).
We can use (5) and (6) to see the effect of changes in the parameters on
the equilibrium force sizes. In the case of ρ:
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g∗
r∗
n
n
Fr
Fg
r
g
y(r∗, g∗)
Figure 2: Conflict equilibrium
∂r∗
∂ρ
= − 2 +
√
φ
2(1 +
√
φ)
< 0 and
∂g∗
∂ρ
=
1
2(1 +
√
φ)
> 0.
An explanation of these signs can be given using the marginal analysis
introduced in the previous section. When ρ increases rebels are able to
capture a larger amount of output for every level of r. This shifts MB to
the left as each individual combatant is now able capture a smaller fraction
of output, and MC upwards since the larger pr implies a larger fraction of
output is lost for each new recruit. Because the two effects go in the same
direction Fr(g) will shift to the left, reducing r.
For the government the implications are the opposite. A bigger support
for the rebels reduces pg for all levels of g, shifting MB to the left and MC
downwards. But since increases in ρ always increase rebels’ income, MC
will fall by a larger amount than MB and thus Fg(r) will move up. In other
words, the government will confront the larger support for the rebels by
increasing its fighting force in order to prevent its output-share from falling.
Increases in γ are analogous, but here it is the government the one that
reduces its armed force because of the negative capture and harm effects, and
the rebels the ones that increase recruitment. As before reaction functions
will shift, but Fg(r) downwards and Fr(g) to the right:
∂r∗
∂γ
=
1
2(
√
φ+ φ)
> 0 and
∂g∗
∂γ
= − 1 + 2
√
φ
2φ(1 +
√
φ)
< 0.
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Changes in n increase both army sizes. A larger n implies a larger output,
so the fraction of it captured by each combatant will rise and shift MB to
the right for both sides. But since n has no effect on the fraction of output
lost by each new recruit (i.e. recruitment comes from the new population),
individual costs will remain unaltered and MC will not move. An increase
in population will have only a positive capture effect, and will thus shift
both reaction functions outwards:
∂r∗
∂n
=
√
φ
2(1 +
√
φ)
> 0 and
∂g∗
∂n
=
1
2(1 +
√
φ)
> 0.
Note that although population size affects recruitment, (5) and (6) are
not influenced by the productivity parameter a. That is, a larger output will
not affect recruitment as long as it is caused by higher productivity and not
by population growth. The reason can be seen in the first order conditions:
an increase in a raises the fraction of output lost for every new recruit by
the same proportion it increases the fraction every combatant can capture.
The result is an upward shift in MC and a right shift of MB that leave
optimal army sizes unaffected10.
Finally, the effect of changes in φ on equilibrium fighting forces is given
by:
∂r∗
∂φ
=
(n + ρ)φ− γ(1 + 2√φ)
4(1 +
√
φ)2φ
3
2
and
∂g∗
∂φ
=
γ(2 + 5
√
φ+ 4φ)− (n+ ρ)φ 32
4φ2(1 +
√
φ)2
.
Starting from a situation where the effectiveness of the two sides is the
same, an increase in φ means government’s soldiers become more effective
at capturing output. Given that d
dφ
(
∂pg
∂g
) is positive when gφ is small and
negative when it is large, an increase in φ raises the effectiveness of the
first soldiers but lowers it for a big army. In other words, the returns from
adopting a better fighting technology are large but fall rapidly.
This is reflected in figure 3 by the movements in MB and MC. For
small values of φ, a raise in the government’s fighting effectiveness increases
marginal benefit to a greater extent than marginal cost and hence increases
g (right panel). For large values, however, an increase in φ will reduce
g because soldiers are already so effective that the extra income captured
by the new technology is insufficient to compensate for the fraction lost
in recruitment (left panel). The overall response is thus an initial upward
movement of Fg(r) when φ is small, and a gradual shift down if φ continues
to raise.
10This does not mean that an increase in a has no influence at all on recruitment; it
will not change army sizes, but it leads to larger values of equilibrium marginal captures.
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Figure 3: Government’s optimal response to increases in φ
For the rebels the increase in φmeans a reduction in their relative combat
effectiveness. This has the opposite effects (i.e. MB and MC shift down-
wards), causing Fr(g) to move to the right. For small values of φ (when g is
likely to rise) MB will fall by a larger amount than MC and so the optimal
response is to reduce r. When φ is large the opposite will take place and
the optimal response will be to increase r.
Output, recruitment and shares
Using (5) and (6) we can determine the values of the rest of the variables
needed to characterize equilibrium. In the case of production:
y∗ = a(n− r∗ − g∗) = a(γ + (n+ ρ)φ)
2φ
, (7)
implying equilibrium output increases with productivity and population size
and with γ and ρ, reflecting the fundamental trade off faced by the parties:
on the one hand recruitment is discretionary, but cannot increase capture
without reducing output; and on the other, population support does not
hurt output, but the effectiveness of a political discourse cannot be increased
endogenously.
Equation (7) has two additional implications. First, given ∂y
∗
∂φ
< 0,
an increase in relative combat effectiveness increases the total amount of
resources the economy dedicates to appropriative activities: the ratio ( g
∗
/r∗)
might fall, but g∗ + r∗ will always rise. Second, it gives an upper bound to
popular support: unless γ < (n − ρ)φ , output under civil war could be
larger than output of total peace y(0, 0).
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Equilibrium shares are obtained by substituting g∗ and r∗ in (2) which,
after some simplification, yields:
p∗r =
1
1 +
√
φ
and p∗g =
√
φ
1 +
√
φ
, (8)
implying that, regardless of productivity, population size or popular sup-
port, the side with a more effective fighting technology will capture a larger
amount of output. The reason for this result lies in the optimizing behavior
of both groups. Using the first order condition for rebels we have:
a pr =
yg
(r + ρ+ γ + g φ)
⇒ ρ+ r
γ + g φ
=
e
ρ+ r + γ + g φ
and for the government:
a pg =
yr
(r + ρ+ γ + g φ)
⇒ γ + g φ
ρ+ r
= φ
[
e
ρ+ r + γ + g φ
]
,
indicating that when combatants are equally effective at fighting, total force
sizes will be the same (ρ + r = γ + g) and income will be equally split.
In other words, the party with smaller popular support compensates for its
relative weakness by recruiting a larger fighting force.
When φ > 1, however, γ + g φ > ρ + r and the government will have a
larger share. Rebels do respond to the government’s soldiers greater effec-
tiveness by increasing r, but only to the point where pr < pg; recruiting more
to prevent their share from falling would have a cost in terms of lowering
yr. Therefore (8) implies that, despite any initial distribution of resources,
income will be split according only to fighting effectiveness, with the more
effective side receiving the larger fraction.
This result differs from Hirshleifer (1991) where the party endowed with
fewer resources improves its income share by committing relatively more
effort to fighting. This is what he calls the paradox of power which, in its
strong form, corresponds to the case when φ = 1 above. Nonetheless he
gives some numerical examples to illustrate the possibility that the paradox
can be violated, but not because of differences in combat effectiveness, but
rather because the importance of having a larger army can be very high11.
Skaperdas (1997) also finds that a larger productivity for appropriative ac-
tivities increases a player’s share in income, but his result is contingent on
the strength of complementarities in production.
11Hirshleifer uses a CSF function in which differences in fighting technology do not
affect fighting effectiveness directly, but through a mass effect parameter that reflects the
importance of having a large army.
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Optimal sizes (5) and (6) can also be used to determine the viability
of recruitment. To see this note that the optimization problems for both
players can be given the standard interpretation of maximizing expected
income. But since n−r−g = e, capturing income can also be interpreted as
a competition for peasants, where parties get hold of the output produced by
the peasants they are able to control. If each side pays wages from captured
output, and if all output is used to pay salaries, in the case of the rebels we
must have:
wrr + weer − ypr = 0,
where wr and we are, respectively, the wages of rebels’ combatants and
peasants. Given that er = epr represents the peasants under rebel control,
the equality becomes wrr − (a − we)er = 0, with a − we being the amount
of each peasant’s production retained by the rebels.
Feasibility in recruitment requires the constraint wr ≥ δ we to be satis-
fied, which says peasants will only become rebels if they can expect to earn
at least δ times the wage of peasants. If we assume δ=1, we can combine the
equality with the fact that we is the difference between a and the amount
retained by the rebels, and write the constraint as12
τ ≥ r
er + r
τ ∈ ( 0, τ¯ ],
which says that for recruitment to be possible, the tax rate τ = a−we
a
im-
posed on peasants must be larger than the share of appropriative resources
in the total amount they control. The maximum feasible tax rate is τ¯ such
that a(1 − τ¯) is the smallest amount of income required for peasants to
engage in production, and τ = 0 does not raise the required resources to
ensure participation.
Due to the symmetry of the cases, the government’s participation con-
straint is defined likewise:
τ ≥ g
eg + g
τ ∈ ( 0, τ¯ ].
12Note that δ can be smaller or greater than 1, reflecting the importance of income
with respect to other motivators in the decision to join the rebel group. Larger values
of δ imply recruitment is more expensive and thus that a greater effort is needed from
peasants to fund rebellion.
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III. Characterization of Equilibria
The above analysis can be put together to determine the circumstances
that lead to investment in fighting forces. Initially the economy has no
combatants so e = n and y = ymax. Among the peasants, the two leaders
choose x and h and decide the size of their fighting forces. Given that we
have assumed output to be a proxy for political power, (8) implies that the
side with the greater fighting effectiveness becomes the government so that
φ ≥ 1.
Once choices are made, two conditions must be satisfied for conflict to
take place: both players have to choose a positive fighting force and recruit-
ment must be feasible. If we use the (ρ, γ) space to determine the levels of
popular support consistent with war, the first condition is given by13:
r∗ ≥ 0 ⇒ γr∗ ≥ (2
√
φ+ φ)ρ− nφ ;
g∗ ≥ 0 ⇒ γg∗ ≤ (n+ ρ)φ
1 + 2
√
φ
,
while the second is determined by the equilibrium values of the participation
constraints14:
PCr : τ¯ ≥ r
∗
e∗r + r
∗
⇒ γPCr ≤
(
(ρ− n)(τ¯ + (τ¯ − 1)√φ)− 2ρ)φ
τ¯ + (τ¯ − 1)√φ ;
PCg : τ¯ ≥ g
∗
e∗g + g
∗
⇒ γPCg ≥
(n + ρ)(τ¯ (1 +
√
φ)− 1)φ
τ¯ − 1 + (τ¯ − 2)√φ .
The four inequalities are plotted in figure 4 15. In the dark grey area the
level of support for both sides is large enough to allow recruitment, but not
so large as to make fighting suboptimal. It corresponds to interior solutions
like the one depicted in figure 2. Starting from any point in this area, an
increase in γ while holding ρ constant reduces g and forces rebels to increase
r in order to prevent their output share from falling. But since ∂y
∗
∂γ
> 0, the
increase in r is smaller than the reduction in g, and output rises. Output
shares remain constant and entirely determined by φ.
13The subindexes in γ represent the values of support for the government that satisfy
each inequality (e.g. γr∗ are the values of γ consistent with r
∗
≥ 0).
14Written like this, the PC constraints say that for recruitment to be possible the
equilibrium share of appropriative resources for each player must be smaller than the
maximum feasible tax rate. Also note that (7) implies e∗ = (γ+(n+ρ)φ)
2φ
.
15Note that y∗ = y(0, 0) along the dotted line, so this line represents the maximum
admissible values for γ and ρ. Also note that the kinks in the PC constraints stem from
the fact that outside the zero army lines force sizes are given by Fr(0) and Fg(0).
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Figure 4: Characterization of Equilibria
The inequalities also define three other possible types of equilibria. Re-
gions shaded in light-grey represent corner solutions where only one player
chooses to fight (armed peace). In the two located between the g∗=0 line and
PCg, the government’s army size is determined by Fg(0), and equilibrium
output and shares by y(0, Fg(0)) and pg(Fg(0), 0) = 1− pr(0, Fg(0)).
Note that although both equilibria involve only the government choosing
to arm, they are qualitatively different. In the first (left of PCr) rebels
would like to fight but, given φ, cannot obtain enough support to capture
the necessary output. Rebellion is financially nonviable because the amount
of income needed to recruit can only be obtained by taxing peasants above
the maximum feasible tax rate. In the second r∗ is zero for the opposite
reasons. Despite being able to recruit, rebels have such a large support
that they find optimal not to fight: having a fighting force would imply a
reduction in income since marginal cost outweighs marginal benefit for any
recruit.
The same analysis can be made for government. In the two light-gray
areas between the r∗=0 line and PCr only the rebels choose to arm. Equi-
librium output and shares are obtained from Fr(0) and lack of financial
viability occurs below PCg.
Finally the three white regions represent corner solutions where both
players choose zero fighting effort (total peace). Here output is ymax and
income shares are determined solely by popular support (p∗g =
γ
γ+ρ = 1−p∗r).
Of the three, the area between PCg and PCr is characterized by peasant’s
indifference: fighting is optimal but impossible because support is so low
that no party is able to capture enough income to recruit. That is, peace
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arises from the financial inviability of war. In the other two one of the
sides can fund fighting but finds it optimal not to do so, while for the other
fighting is optimal but financial constraints impede it.
Note that all of the above discussion depends on the specific values of tax
rates and relative combat effectiveness. Changes in τ¯ and φ will therefore
affect the size and shape of the different regions. In the case of the tax
rate, impact on the likelihood of war comes only from the participation
constraints. That is
dPCr
dτ¯
=
2ρ(1 +
√
φ)φ
(τ¯ + (τ¯ − 1)√φ)2 > 0 and
PCg
dτ¯
= − 2(n+ ρ)(1 +
√
φ)φ
3
2
(τ¯ − 1 + (τ¯ − 2)√φ)2 < 0,
which indicate that, for a given level of support for the opponent, an increase
in the maximum feasible tax rate makes recruitment possible for both sides
with smaller own support (i.e. both participation constraints shift towards
the origin). Note also that since τ = 1− we
a
, an increase in τ¯ can come either
from larger productivity or smaller wages.
The impact of changes in combat effectiveness is determined differently.
If we focus on the area between the two zero army lines, the inequalities
have the following properties16:
(P1)
dγr∗
dρ
,
dγg∗
dρ
> 0 ∀ φ ≥ 0 ;
(P2)
dγr∗
dρ
>
dγPCr
dρ
,
dγg∗
dρ
<
dγPCg
dρ
for τ¯ > 0 ;
(P3) γPCr = γr∗ = −nφ for ρ = 0 ;
(P4) γg∗ = γPCg = 0 for ρ = −n.
Therefore, in the case of the rebels, an increase in φ shifts r∗=0 and PCr
to the right, reflecting the fact that for a given level of government support ρ
must be larger if the rebels are to have a positive army. For the government
the effect is ambiguous. The g∗=0 line shifts up since
dγg∗
dφ
> 0, but the
impact on PCg depends on the sign of
dPCg
dφ
. We can use this last derivative
to determine the critical value of φ that makes
dPCg
dφ
= 0. Since τ¯ must be
between zero and one, and since
d2PCg
dφ2
< 0 over that interval, it is given by:
16Although not necessary for determining the impact of movements in φ, these additional
properties show the tax rate consistent with unconstrained recruitment:
dγPCg
dρ
, γPCg = 0 if τ¯ = p
∗
r and lim
τ¯→p∗
g
dγPCr
dρ
=∞ , lim
τ¯→p∗
g
ρPCr = 0.
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φc =
(τ¯ − 1)2 (1 + 2t2 − (2τ¯ − 1)√1 + 4τ¯ )
2τ¯2(τ¯ − 2)2 ,
which implies that only if φ < φc can increases in φ lead to upward shifts
in PCg
17. Therefore an increase in φ will always shift the civil war area to
the right and, provided it is large enough, will always bring peace (figure 5).
The type of peace, however, depends on the values of τ¯ and φ. If φ < φc
an increase in φ shifts PCg up as in the figure and the economy can end up
in the total peace region (point P1). The reason is that when φ is small an
increase in φ leads to an increase in g and in the government’s share but
also to a reduction in output; so if peasants cannot be heavily taxed (i.e.
small τ¯), the increase in capture may not be large enough to compensate
the fall in output and could leave the government with insufficient resources
to recruit. Otherwise the economy will move to the armed peace region
with the government capturing enough income to pay for its army, and the
rebels unable to recruit due to lower output and a relatively smaller fighting
effectiveness (point P2).
PCr(φ1) r
∗=0(φ1)
g∗=0(φ1)
γ
PCg(φ1)
P2
P1
ρ
Figure 5: Equilibrium impact of an increase in φ
The road to war
The above analysis implies there can be many different roads to war. One
of particular historical importance, and a source of influence for many in-
17Note that since φc depends only on τ¯ and φ ≥ 1, φ < φc implies τ¯ / 0.36.
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surgencies, is Mao’s protracted popular war. His approach, used in the anti-
Japanese and anti-Koumintang wars, consists of three distinctive phases.
The first is the strategic defensive, which occurs when the enemy is in the
offensive and the insurgent’s primary goal is survival. Their effort is focused
on political activities such as propaganda, recruitment of local political lead-
ers and the organization of demonstrations and other acts of protest. At this
stage the use of force is kept to a minimum, consisting mainly of selective
terrorism to gain support by demonstrating willingness and capability to
fight and by trying to provoke disproportionate government repression.
The second is the strategic stalemate, characterized by the use of guerrilla
warfare. Ideally the effort made in the first stage should allow insurgents to
establish bases in remote areas and carry surprise attacks on government’s
forces. They will seek to form a parallel government in the areas they control,
and try to drive government’s forces in to a strategic defensive. The need for
a full-time guerrilla force arises in this phase, specially in the later stages.
Phase three is the strategic offensive where guerrilla forces are trans-
formed to conventional armies. On the military side the objective is to
defeat government forces, while in the political side to take control of gov-
ernment. In the end, the large scale of military victories and the insurgent’s
political strength should lead to the collapse of the government and the
triumph of rebellion.
In terms of the model, the strategic defensive corresponds to the armed
peace area between the zero army lines where g∗ > 0. Rebels do not have
enough support to finance rebellion, so they keep military operations to a
minimum (r∗ = 0) and focus on political organization. If a more effective
political discourse that increases ρ for a given γ becomes available, or if a
more effective fighting technology can be found, they could capture enough
income to move to phase two inside the civil war area.
Phase three will take place only if the new technology makes rebels more
effective at fighting (i.e. Φ(hr) > Φ(hg)) so that they can seize power. If
the change in φ is large enough, or if the effectiveness of the government’s
political discourse falls sufficiently relative to their opponents’, rebels will
drive the government to the strategic offensive and leave the civil war area18.
A different approach to the protracted popular war is the military-focus
strategy. In contrast to Mao’s this strategy makes no systematic attempt to
win popular support, but instead directs efforts to military operations. Here
popular support is expected to come either from military victory or from
direct efforts after power has been taken. In the model, the military-focus
strategy can be represented as a reduction in φ for a given ρ that pushes
the economy into war by shifting the civil war area to the left. As before,
final victory is seen to be attainable through combat effectiveness superiority
if φ falls enough to give power to the rebels and leave the civil war area.
18See section one for a discussion of the factors that can affect γ, ρ and φ.
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Note that one particularly important source of change in φ can be external
intervention. This was the case, for example, in countries like Nicaragua,
Angola and Afghanistan, where civil wars where seen by superpowers as a
battlefield for the cold war.
Another strategy that has frequently been employed by insurgents is
conspiracy. Essentially conspiracies are coups organized by small groups —
military or civilian— to get hold of power. They rely on secrecy, organization
and careful planning and are generally carried out in urban settings close to
centers of government. As O’Neil (p. 32) points out, “[although] environ-
mental factors, such as economic regression and maldistribution, political
disorder, and corruption may be the underlying causes of the insurrection,
the defection of military officers is the crucial variable”. Moreover, little
or no attention is paid to popular support, and “the extent [to which] the
views of the masses are taken into consideration, calculations center on pub-
lic acceptance of the outcome”. In other words, conspirators know that the
only way to power is by controlling those that control armed power. In this
respect the strategy is similar to the military focus strategy, but it differs in
the sense that the rebels seek to control the army by winning the loyalty of
the incumbent officers instead of trying to replace them.
In the model conspiracies correspond to an attempt of seizing government
by winning the support of the military to reverse Φ(hg)/Φ(hr). Starting from
a point in the armed peace region, if such a strategy becomes available,
its success would depend on the magnitude of the change in φ and on the
public’s acceptance of the coup. A conspiracy can succeed in overthrowing
the government, but it can also send the economy into the civil war area if
the toppled government manages to retain large amounts of support.
Finally two other possible outcomes should be mentioned. The first is a
situation where rebellion is viable despite insurgents being highly unpopular.
If φ is sufficiently low, an economy can be at war despite γ ≫ ρ. But for
this to happen insurgents must be able to capture large amounts of output
by force in order to compensate for the lack of support. Natural resources
provide such an opportunity as shown by the cases of diamonds in West
Africa or cocaine in Colombia19.
Second, the opposite is also possible. For large enough values of φ, armed
peace can occur even if γ ≪ ρ; that is, a situation of repressive peace where
government retains power by being effective at using force to overcome lack
of support and repress the desire for political change. Throughout history
many examples can be found of tyrannies and other authoritarian regimes
that meet this description.
19Collier and Hoeﬄer (2001) find that the risk of civil war is substantially higher in
economies dependent on natural resource exports.
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Conclusion
This paper follows the literature that sees conflict as the product of opti-
mizing decisions by agents trying to strike a balance between productive
and appropriative activities. The approach adopted here, however, is one
of a competition for peasants’ output where parties fight using political and
military means, and where asymmetries in fighting technology are reflected
directly in the effectiveness of combatants. In this setting conflict can oc-
cur, but only if both parties are capable of obtaining —either by force or
through the voluntary support of peasants— enough resources to recruit
and maintain an armed group.
Although the model relies on specific functional forms and is built on
a static, perfect-information framework, the results obtained are consistent
with various historical accounts of the different roads to war and with em-
pirical evidence on the consequences of conflict. Civil wars do generate large
costs in terms of lost output, worsen income distribution and shift spending
to military activities.
With the appropriate parameter values, the model can also explain sit-
uations like the continued existence of highly unpopular rebel groups, the
failure of insurgents to topple tyrannical regimes or cases where peace pre-
vails even in the absence of an army. In the end it is the interplay of popular
support and fighting effectiveness that determines which type of equilibrium
arises.
The results also have three important implications in terms of the me-
chanics of conflict. The first has to do with the debate surrounding the role
of grievances in civil war. Even if injustice does increase popular support,
and thus the financial viability of rebellion, it may not be sufficient to fund
recruitment and push the economy to war; especially if the government has
a very effective army, as in the case of authoritarian regimes. So maybe it is
effective repression what explains the difficulty in establishing an empirical
link between grievances and war.
The second is related to the fact that conflict is more prevalent in poor
countries. Here implications are the opposite: holding everything else con-
stant, a more productive economy should have a larger feasible tax rate and
thus be more likely to experience war. Nevertheless tax rates, as defined
in the model, are also dependent on the reservation wages of peasants and
have to be consistent with specific levels of popular support and fighting
effectiveness to generate war. So perhaps, if the results of this model are to
be accepted, wealthier economies experience less conflict not because they
are wealthy but because they have more effective armies, because their po-
litical institutions haver greater legitimacy and because rebellion does not
generate much real support.
The third has to do with the requirements for successful peace agree-
ments. The analysis of changes in fighting effectiveness suggests that, at
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a minimum, they should include disarmament (i.e. one of the groups must
give up their weapons to increase the other’s fighting effectiveness). But
disarmament can only fulfill this role if it is large enough for one of the
peace areas to be reached and if it guarantees weapons are rendered useless.
Otherwise it may fail to stop conflict and, even if it does, leave the economy
under the threat of rearmament. But note that by no means is disarmament
a sufficient condition: other arrangements have to be in place for disarma-
ment to be incentive-compatible, such as power-sharing pacts, third party
intervention and plans for the reintegration of former combatants.
Finally note that although this analysis has focused on civil wars, it
can easily be extended to litigation, lobbying, political campaigning and, in
general, to any rent seeking activity that includes a battle for public support
and that can be subject to asymmetries in fighting.
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